But the American equipment was proving superior. Artillery was an American specialty, and the heavy batteries of 105mm and 155mm were better than any other Army. The US Sherman tank, the mainstay of armored divisions by late 1943, was not as heavily armored or as powerfully gunned as their German counterparts, but they were more reliable and easier to maintain. The US Army Air Forces, soon after the war to be the US Air Force, joined with the RAF to hold almost total air superiority over the battlefield.
In subsequent after-action reports, an American invention, the GIs were found to fire their rifles far less that believed, fought for their buddies in their unit rather than for ideology or popular war aims, and were happy to go home when relived. Units were not withdrawn after combat, but stocked with replacements and sent back to the front. Units like the 1st Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Division, and 2nd Armored Division, in constant battle for years, suffered 200% casualties.
By the end of 1944, on every battlefield except the China-Burma-India Theatre of Operations, American forces advanced confidently. Difficult terrain, long supply lines, and too few troops marked the CBI Theatre; small units like Merrill’s Marauders made tangible gains.
By 1945, the US Army had 8,300,000 men and women out of 12,350,000 Americans in uniform. When the Germans surrendered, the Army planned to transfer European Units to Japan for the final invasion. Over 1,000,000 casualties were expected (although that source has never been identified.) The use of the Atomic Bomb made an invasion unnecessary. 318,274 Army personnel were killed and 565,861 were wounded on the ground and in the air.
The miracle that Marshall created — a professional army out of civilians — is often overlooked in the massive quantities of war machines produced by the United States. In the absence of a long, continuous military tradition, the United States Army created a flexible, creative officer corps in command of motivated and well-equipped enlisted men that were the equal of the militaristic programs of education of both Germany and Japan.